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Introduction 
 
an has been the concern of various philosophical schools of thought 
and can be said as the center of philosophical inquiry. However, not 
all of the concerns of philosophy points to defend man in his 
external and internal dimensions.  In Karol Wojtyla’s philosophy of the Human 
Person, he interprets man as not being solely as a “rational animal.” He offers 
instead an understanding of man viewing his innerness as a person manifested 
not only by his existence, but more importantly through his actions. In this 
paper, the fundamental concepts of Wojtyla’s Human Person are precisely 
enumerated for a clear understanding of who a Human Person is.  
  This paper aims to interpret man in his two-fold character, as a Person 
and as a Subject using Karol Wojtyla’s Personalism. In this task, one must be 
noted that Wojtyla employs Thomism and Phenomenology in his thought. In 
the discussion, I will lay down the primary distinction between these two 
concepts for a better understanding of the anthropological structure of man, 
his innerness and exteriority. The discussion has three divisions, the first part 
discusses the two different ways of understanding Human Being; the second 
part discusses the concept of Person; and the third part discusses the Human 
Subject.  
 
Ways to Understand the Human Being 
  
  To approach the proper understanding of human being, it is worth to 
note the distinction between the concepts of man and person.  Man and 
Person are essentially different, but they complement each other. In his essay, 
Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being, Wojtyla presents two types of 
understanding that we can use to arrive at a clear grasp of these two concepts: 
the cosmological type and personalistic type. The former “understands the human 
being as being in the world and engenders human being’s reducibility, also, to 
the world”. The latter, on the other hand, “understands the human being 
inwardly” - this personalistic type of understanding the human being is not the 
M  
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antinomy of the cosmological type but its complement.1 Essentially, the 
approach of the personalistic type is to understand man in his innerness, his 
unique and irreducible character. Unlike the cosmological type, which classifies 
man merely as a creature in the world together with other lower beings, the 
personalistic type brings forth the incomparable and distinct character of man 
present in his innerness.  
  Wojtyla asserts that the cosmological type of understanding holds the 
definition of Aristotle of man: homo est animal rationale. He traces the Traditional 
Aristotelian Anthropology in associating man with the cosmos. He argues, 
 
This definition fulfills Aristotle’s requirements for 
defining the species (human being) through its proximate 
genus (living being) and the feature that distinguishes the 
given species in that genus (endowed with reason). At the 
same time, however, the definition is constructed in such 
a way that it excludes the possibility of accentuating the 
irreducible in the human being. Therefore, it implies a 
belief in the reducibility of the human being to the 
world.2   
 
  Since Aristotle made such contribution in classifying individual 
creatures, the whole of scientific investigation “moved within the framework of 
this definition, and consequently, within the context of the belief that the 
essentially human is basically reducible to the world.”3 In effect, the human is 
treated merely as an “object, one of the objects in the world to which the human 
being visibly and physically belongs.”4 From this conception one sheds light 
the notion of objectivity which also presupposes reducibility of man. Wojtyla 
stands against the reduction of man to the level of the world and refuses to 
explain humanity merely in terms of its genus and its specific difference. Man, 
he asserts, is irreducible, and this irreducibility is identified with the subjectivity 
of man as a person.5 Thus, it proceeds to the personalistic type of 
understanding human being.  
  The personalistic type of understanding rests on a 
 
. . . belief in the primordial uniqueness of the human being, and 
thus in the basic irreducibility of the human being to the natural 
world. This belief stands at the basis of understanding the 
human being as a person, which has an equally long 
                                                 
  1 Karol Wojtyla, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” in Person and 
Community: Selected Essays (Catholic Thought from Lublin, Vol. 4), trans. by Theresa Sandok (New 
York: Lang, 1993), 213.  Hereafter cited as SIHB. 
  2 Ibid., 211.  
  3 Ibid.  
  4 Ibid. 
  5 Rolyn B. Fransisco, Karol Wojtyla’s Theory of Participation: Based on his Christian 
Personalism (Manila: St. Paul’s, 1995), 13.    
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tenure in the history of philosophy; it also accounts today 
for the growing emphasis on the person as a subject and 
for the numerous efforts aimed at interpreting the 
personal subjectivity of the human being.6  
 
  Irreducibility signifies that man cannot be merely cognized, that what 
is essential in him cannot be reduced, but only manifested and revealed 
(through experience). This belief in irreducibility serves as the foundation for 
understanding personal subjectivity.7 The inward characterization of man 
transcending cosmological and corporeal limitations, views man as distinct 
among the reducible things, as somebody who has his own powers and 
abilities. It clearly points the unique character of the human being as someone 
who stands incomparable to other creatures because of his capacity as a 
personal subject to go beyond his cosmological composition. He is not just a 
mere “man” which is reducible to the world, but a person, a subject that 
transcends his corporeality.  
  Wojtyla tries to reconcile the two ways of understanding human being 
– the cosmological and personalistic, with the latter complementing the former. 
He does it treating man in two opposing ways: 8 both as 1.) subject and 2.) 
object. Wojtyla further argues that, “the subjectivity of the human person is 
also something objective.”9 This is made possible through the human 
experience. In other words, man as a subject, determines outwardly the object 
of his action. But also along with the determination of the object of his action, 
the act bounces back to himself as a determined object of his own action. In 
action, the subject determines an outer object, but he is also the object 
determined by his action. He knows that he performs certain action, and above 
all, he knows that he is the one performing the action. He meets and knows 
himself as the doer of his action. Man, therefore, becomes the subject and 
object of the action.  
 
The Concept of Person 
 
  Having his Thomistic influence in his philosophical formation, Wojtyla 
assimilated some fundamental concepts of St. Thomas Aquinas and integrated 
it to his own Personalism. However, it is important to note that St. Thomas’ 
definition is also an assimilation from what Boethius (a precursor) mentioned 
about the person.10  Wojtyla writes, 
 
                                                 
  6 SIHB, 211.   
  7 Fransisco, op. cit., 13.  
  8 Cf. Fransisco, op. cit., 14.  
  9 SIHB, 211.  
  10 In his essay “Thomistic Personalism,”  Wojtyla writes: “The best proof is the fact 
that St. Thomas continually has recourse to a definition of the person . . . [which] formulated by 
Boethius.” [Karol Wojtyla, “Thomistic Personalism” (TP), in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 
167.]   
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The person is a concrete man, the individua substantia of 
the classical Boethian definition. The concrete is in a way 
tantamount to the unique, or at any rate, to the 
individualized. The concept of the person is broader and 
more comprehensive than the concept of the 
“individual,” just as the person is more than 
individualized nature. The person would be an individual 
whose nature is rational – according to Boethius’ full 
definition persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.11  
 
  For Wojtyla, the person’s definition as an individual, or a concrete man 
with a rational nature, “mainly marked out the metaphysical terrain – the 
dimensions of being – in which personal human subjectivity is realized, 
creating in a sense, a condition for building upon this terrain on the basis of 
experience.”12 With this individuality emphasized by Wojtyla, a person can 
have access to the external reality. Individuality, then, presupposes corporeality.  
His concrete humanness enables him to be metaphysically and ontologically 
grounded, thus can have authentic involvement in his experience.  
  Wojtylan scholars nonetheless, would have varied viewpoints on the 
matter. Schmitz points out that Wojtyla finds the classical definition of 
Boethius correct but insufficient because it stresses the individuality of the 
human person and reduces or compares him with other things in nature, 
whereas the consideration of a human being as person points up the 
irreducibility and uniqueness of each human person.13 Furthermore, Ronald 
Lawler perceives the definition as too limited. He remarks that the definition 
does not express the richness of the person. It implies that individuals appear 
to be parts of a generic whole, as one member of an aggregate; hence, it 
adequately describes the human person who is seen more completely as 
suppositum or subject.14 In addition, Wojtyla asserts that,  
 
. . . neither the concept of the “rational nature” nor that 
of its individualization seems to express fully the specific 
completeness expressed by the concepts of the person. 
The completeness we are speaking of here seems to be 
something that is unique in a very special sense rather than 
concrete.15 
 
  In this sense, Wojtyla emphasized the importance of “uniqueness” as 
an essential character of human beings rather than “concreteness.” 
                                                 
  11 Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. Andrej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. 
Co., 1979), 73.  Hereafter cited as AP. 
  12 SIHB, 212.  
13 Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of 
Karol Wojtyla (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 40.  
  14 As quoted in Fransisco, op. cit., 15.  
  15 AP, 73-74.   
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Concreteness directly presupposes having a body, which is reducible to the 
world. But uniqueness is something inalienable to human beings, which 
characterize them significantly among other corporeal creatures. “The 
completeness of ontological structure of the person, then, consists in the 
dynamic nature of beings as existing and as acting.”16     
  In his essay Thomistic Personalism, Wojtyla assimilates St. Thomas’s basic 
foundational definition of the person: 
 
For St. Thomas, the person is of course a subject – a very 
distinctive subject of existence and activity.17  
 
The person is always rational and free concrete being, 
capable of all those activities that reason and freedom 
alone make possible.18 
 
  These Thomistic definitions of the person are valuable in Wojtyla’s 
own concept of person. It implies the property and qualities of the person 
which the person himself possesses. The person is described as a subject, 
which can be considered as his property and ground for existence and actions. 
Later, discussions will be made on the significant point of Wojtyla, as he argues 
that action reveals the person. Not only that a person is an existent entity, but 
makes something out of his existence with the use of his qualities – reason and 
freedom.  With his individuality (concreteness), being rational and free is 
always possessed by the person himself.  
 
The Human Subject 
 
  Wojtyla provides an objective conception of the human being. He 
writes, 
 
As we know, the objectivity of the conception of the 
human being itself required the postulate that the human 
being is (1) separate suppositum – a subject of existence 
and action; and, (2) a person – persona.19 
 
  The previous part is devoted to the articulation of the concept of 
person. The postulation of these two concepts that constitute human being 
understands man in a personalistic sense, and therefore excludes the tendency 
of its reducibility to the world. The attention is now focused on man as a 
personal subject – a suppositum and a person. Suppositum refers to “man as the 
                                                 
  16 Fransisco, op. cit., 15.  
  17 TP, 170 
  18 Ibid., 167.  
  19 SIHB, 212.   
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existing being and acting, it is the classical concept of subject.”20 As he was 
deeply influenced by Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Wojtyla aims to establish 
man’s subjectivity in metaphysical terms. Thus, The Acting Person translated 
suppositum21  into “subject”. The term metaphysical, does not mean 
“extraphenomenal”, but rather transphenomenal. Wojtyla declares that man, as 
the subject of his own experience and action, must be perceived through his 
whole experience as man which constitutes as he exists and acts. 22 
 
Metaphysical subjectivity, or the suppositum, as the 
transphenomenal and therefore fundamental expression 
of the experience of the human being, is also the gurantor 
of the identity of this human being in existence and 
activity.23  
 
  Grounding the subject metaphysically enables him to be identified 
with his own actions and existence, therefore, his identity is dependent on how 
he exists and acts. It is based on the innerness of human activity, as it is 
externally expressed in human experience. As Wojtyla describes that it allows 
us to see the “in-selfness and inwardness of human activity and existence”24 
and also “allows and legitimately requires us to conceive the human being as 
the subject of that existence and activity.”25  It is only through man’s 
subjectivity that he can express himself in the totality of his experience, of 
course, through his own existence and acting. Reversely, “it is also through 
human experience that man’s subjectivity is clearly understood.”26  
  In relation to the reducibility and irreducibilty of man, Wojtyla clearly 
points out the element that is irreducible in human beings.  
 
Subjectivity is a term proclaiming that the human being’s 
proper essence cannot be totally reduced to and explained 
by the proximate genus and specific difference. Subjectivity 
is, then, a kind of synonym for the irreducible in the human being.27 
 
                                                 
  20 Fransisco, op. cit., 16. “Etymologically, suppositum indicates what is placed under 
(sub-ponere). In anthropology, Wojtyla writes, it is the subject who is “under” every acting and 
happening” [Jaroslaw Kupczak, Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol 
Wojtyla (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 103]. 
  21 Suppositum or suppositum humanum can be interpreted as the self or as the subject. 
Wojtyla writes, “The self is nothing other than the concrete suppositum humanun” [Karol 
Wojtyla, “Person: Subject and Community,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays,” 231].  
Hereafter cited as PSC.   
  22 Ibid., 17. 
  23 PSC., 223.   
  24 Ibid., 227.  
25 Ibid., 222. 
  26 Fransisco, op. cit., 17.  
  27  SIHB,  211. It is the complete opposite of objectivity, which Wojtyla defines as 
connected with the general assumption of the reducibility of the human being. Ibid.  
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  Subjectivity, then, characterizes the uniqueness inherent to man as 
manifested through his existence and his actions, or, his total experience. 
Subjectivity transcends cosmological understanding of man, and therefore, 
going beyond corporeal structures of his concreteness and individuality. 
Meanwhile, there is an essential discrepancy between subjectivity and 
subjectivism. 
 
Subjectivism, as here considered seems to consist first, in 
a complete separation of experience from action and 
second, in reducing to the mere status of consciousness 
and moral values that germinate in this discussion as well 
as in the person.28   
 
  In trying to avoid (absolute) subjectivism, Wojtyla says that such, as a 
mental attitude, tends to absolutize consciousness.  Wojtyla maintains that 
consciousness is merely an aspect of man.29 He agrues that “as long as 
consciousness is maintained merely as an aspect, it serves only to gain a better 
understanding of the subjectivity of man, in particular of his inner relation.”30 
  Wojtyla emphatically considers the role of consciousness and 
experience in affirming subjectivity of man. He states that, 
 
…the self [subject] is constituted through the mediation 
of consciousness in the suppositum humanum within the 
context of the whole existence (esse) and activity proper 
to the suppositum.31  
 
  Wojtyla firmly stresses that the subject is only constituted only upon 
the merging of consciousness and experience (action and existence). 
Consciousness primarily “allows man to experience himself as the subject,”32 
and in the field of experience “the human being appears both as a particular 
suppositum and as a concrete self, in every instance unique and 
unrepeatable.”33 The former allows man to be conscious of himself, that is 
cognitively, while the latter establishes man’s ontological and existential 
structure. However, Wojtyla does not dichotomize these two aspects. In fact, 
he seeks to mediate the two. According to him, “it is far better, therefore, to try 
to coordinate and join together the two aspect, (1) the aspect of being (man, 
person) with  the aspects of consciousness; (2) the acts (acting and action) with 
the aspect of experience.”34  
 
                                                 
  28 AP, 58.  
  29 Cf. Fransisco, op. cit., 17. 
  30 AP, 58. 
  31 PSC, 227.  
32 AP, 57.  
33 PSC, 221. 
34 AP, 57.   
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The Fulfillent of the Person through Action 
 
  Wojtyla asserts that action “can be assigned to no other agent than a 
person.”35 Moreover, the person as the agent of the action is strictly connected 
with the concrete human action, and this connection has a causal and efficient 
character. Consequently, because of this connection, the action cannot be 
divorced from that person and cannot be attributed to someone else as its 
author. 36 The action becomes the property of the person and as soon as the 
person becomes conscious of his being an agent, he takes possession of 
himself as well.    
  In the old adage, operari sequitur esse, Wojtyla is able to explain how 
action can fully understand the subjectivity of human being, thereby 
emphasizing the importance of action.  
 
If operari results from esse, then operari is also – 
proceeding in the opposite direction – the most proper 
avenue to knowledge of that esse… Operari, taken as the 
total dynamism of the human being, enables us to arrive 
at a more precise and proper understanding of the 
subjectivity of the human being.37  
 
  For Wojtyla, “action reveals the person.”38 It is this path that Wojtyla 
wants to proceed from to manifest and affirm the person. Furthermore, he 
describes the action as “the form of operari that has the most basic essential 
significance for grasping the subjectivity of the human being.”39 As the action 
is being performed by the subject, he gains firm understanding of his 
subjectivity, or, he attains consciousness of himself as the agent of the action, 
at the same time emerging from oneself the revelation of his own personhood. 
These two moments, understanding or consciousness and revelation, are vital 
in the subjectivity and personhood of man. In addition, a vital consequent of 
action is considered by Wojtyla, enabling man to possess himself in his 
consciousness of his own action.  
 
An action as an actus humanus (human act) is the actual 
fullness in the order of operari. The person, however, is 
always included within the compass of the action’s 
fulfillment. The action as an actus humanus reveals the 
inwardness and in-selfness of the person and also 
activates the self-possession and self governance proper 
to the structure of the person.40 
                                                 
  35 Ibid., 11. 
  36 PSC, 228 
  37 Ibid., 223.  
38 AP, 11.  
39 PSC, 224.  
  40 Ibid., 232.  
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  Not only does action grasp an understanding of one’s own subjectivity 
and reveal one’s own personhood. It also allows the person himself to possess 
and govern himself in acting. Moreover, human action provides a moment 
where the person can also fulfill himself with reference to morality and the 
objective good. Importantly, Wojtyla emphasizes the role of conscience in 
performing human actions.  
 
An analysis of conscience also reveals the strict 
connection between transcendence and fulfillment… In 
fulfilling an action, I fulfill myself in it if the action is 
“good,” which means in accord with my conscience. By 
acting in this way, I myself become good and am good as 
a human being.41  
 
  Conscience dictates that actions must be in accord with goodness and 
truthfulness. As the subject executes his actions with an authentic 
consideration of goodness and truthfulness, he fulfills himself. For Wojtyla, the 
true fulfillment of the person is accomplished not by a mere performance of 
every action but by positive moral virtuality of the action, while, an evil action 
brings a non-fulfillment of the acting person.42 Wojtyla argues, 
 
Human actions once performed do not vanish without 
trace; they leave their moral value, which constitutes an 
objective reality intrinsically cohesive with the person, 
and thus a reality also profoundly subjective. Being a 
person man is “somebody” he may be either good or 
bad.43  
 
  Non-fulfillment of oneself is attained if the action is deviated from 
what is good and true. Self-fulfillment in action is, therefore, presupposed in 
morality. However, man must have the basic ability of distinguishing the truth 
from falsehood. It is the mind, the essential faculty of man, which recognizes 
moral truthfulness, which is primarily embedded in man’s concern for his 
being.44  
 
Conclusion 
 
  Wojtyla upholds the importance of personhood and subjectivity in the 
existence of man. These two properties of man do not constitute the corporeal 
or physical human structures, but it is an inner character, a mode of existence, 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 234-235. 
42 Kupczak, op. cit., 127.  
  43 AP, 151.  
  44 Cf. Ibid., 158.   
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a power and ability of man in his mere existence. The subjectivity of man is 
proper to person. In other words, human subjectivity is properly realized and 
fulfilled in the person. It presupposes the complementariness of the two 
separate properties of man, as a person and a subject. Personhood is derived 
from nature, meaning, it is a primary character of man, while subjectivity, is the 
capacity that enables man for action, existence and most of all, experience. 
Human nature is the basis of personhood, while subjectivity has its foundation 
on the existential manifestation of man as seen in action, experience, and 
existence. To sum up, the person resides in the innerness of man, while the 
manifestation of subjectivity is from the internal going to the external realm of 
the subject, e.g., the performance of an action. Subjectivity is rooted in the 
person. All actions done by the subject, derives from the person. Moreover, 
since the personhood resides in the innerness of man – a hidden and 
uncognizable character – its manifestation can be revealed when the dynamism 
of the human subject is performed. The person is revealed through his actions, 
as Wojtyla refers to it. The affirmation of the person is achieved through 
subjectivity of man. However, Wojtyla does not cease to assert the importance 
of action without reference to morality and the objective good. The person 
fulfills himself as long as he acts in accord to goodness and truthfulness. This 
assertion tells us that Wojtyla delineates the capacity of the person for action, 
and in turn, the effect of the action as a way of the person’s self-fulfillment. In 
this manner, Wojtyla does not only tell us how action affirms the person, but 
also how can action make us a “good” or “bad” person. 
 
The Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines 
 
References 
 
Fransisco, Rolyn B., Karol Wojtyla’s Theory of Participation: Based on his 
Christian Personalism (Manila: St. Paul’s, 1995).  
Kupczak, Jaroslaw, Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol 
Wojtyla (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000). 
Schmitz, Kenneth L., At the Center of Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology 
of Karol Wojtyla (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1993).  
Wojtyla, Karol, Person and Community: Selected Essays (Catholic Thought from Lublin, 
Vol. 4), trans. by Theresa Sandok (New York: Lang, 1993). 
___________, The Acting Person, trans. Andrej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Pub. Co., 1979). 
 